The following text was provided by:
The
Question and Answer session with Donald
Rumsfeld
STEVENS:
Mr. Secretary, of the many things you addressed really pending before the Armed
Services Committee, I hope we will address the questions before this committee
that pertain to the budget that's been presented, and I would ask senators to
limit themselves to seven minutes in the first round to see what we can do. We
may not get through them all in the time that's allotted to us today.
Mr. Secretary, much of what you said is correct, and I think we all stand in
awe
of this generation and what they've done. I've often compared this generation
to
the generation of Senator (Inaudible) and I and Senator Hollings were part of
that some people call the Greatest Generation.
But most of our people were draftees. The people you've dealt with now are
volunteers. The people that placed themselves in harm's way on the basis of
their own decisions, and think they're the finest military force the world's
ever seen. We're all proud of them, very proud of them, and want to do
everything we can to assist you to see to it that we maintain that force as we
go out into the future.
Having said that, though, I do express again our sadness that
we're not able to
go visit the war zone.
STEVENS:
We have done that on every occasion. I remember when Senator Belmont (ph) and I
went into
shelled and everything else. We never asked for special protection. But in this
instance, we have been denied so far the opportunity to see
those restrictions will be lifted in the near future. I don't ask for any
commitment. I just do express that hope.
One of the things that continues to bother me as a
former cargo plane pilot is
the status of the tankers. They now average more than 45 years in age, and at
least one-third of them are in the depots for repair. And it was suggested to
me
the other day that I should ask you and Mitch Daniels to join some of us here
and go out to tinker and take a look at those planes that we're trying to
repair.
Even after we put them through a year of repair, they're still unfit for
service. They still have rust and every kind of deterioration in terms of their
structural capability and, yet, we're insisting on putting them back out --
putting money into them to try and make them fly some more when they average 44
years of age.
Now, Mr. Secretary, we've provided several times now for the funds to start a
tanker leasing program, and I hope that you are going to be able to tell us
what's going to happen to that program now.
RUMSFELD:
Mr. Chairman, first let me say that I believe it is very important that members
of the House and the Senate, who are on relevant committees and interested,
have
opportunities to visit the men and women in uniform and to observe firsthand
and
fulfill their responsibilities -- their oversight responsibilities.
RUMSFELD:
I have talked to General Franks about this. We have worked out what we believe
is an appropriate arrangement with the speaker of the House and with the
leadership in the Senate, and there certainly will be an opportunity for you
and
your associates to be able to go to
Second, with respect to the tanker issue, everything you have said, sir, is
clearly correct. The tanker fleet is old, it has to be replaced. It will be
replaced.
The lease-buy issue is one that the department has been wrestling with for some
time, and I regret to say still is. We're plowing new ground, here. It's not
something the department has done in the past to any great extent.
It certainly will be precedent setting and it -- I felt it required
appropriately a look by an outside entity and asked one to make a study of it.
That report is back. The sheer size of this leasing proposal that was pending
is
something like 125 pages with 80 different clauses, and it is not something
that
can be done quickly or easily, nor is it something that should take as much
time
as it's taken.
You're right about the corrosion, you're right about the need for replacement,
and certainly the department will be pressing for a conclusion with respect to
it.
One of the things that's taking place, I am told, at the present time, by those
folks working on it -- and you may want to comment, Dov
-- is they are still
trying to negotiate a better price. And there's some active debate about what
the appropriate price ought to be.
STEVENS:
Mr. Secretary, I only have five minutes. I can only
say this: We suggested that
leasing proposition when we came back from
pilots who expressed to us their fear of flying those planes. That's almost
two-and-a-half years ago, I think two years ago at least.
RUMSFELD:
I think we ought to put some of the people who are holding us up in those
tankers and let them fly a little bit and see them and listen to them creak.
But
this delay is unconscionable as far as I'm concerned.
I hope we can find some way -- and, again, I urge you, I ask you, get one of
your planes and fly down there next week, and just take the people from OMB
that
are holding this up and let them see those planes, because if they see them and
understand that the concept of breeding metal fatigue and the whole concept of
rust and what that means to these people that are flying them, the idea of
putting money into them so they can go out there and fly again for another 20
years is just absurd.
STEVENS:
I've got one other question to ask, and I'd like to get down to the money if I
can. I want to ask particularly, because of the problems we face now, we passed
the
and upon operational assumptions. I'd like to know, do you have enough money to
finish this year, fiscal year '03? Are we going to be able to see through the
remainder operations of
RUMSFELD:
The -- I guess it's now May 14th, the fiscal year ends October 1st. We still
have a number of months in fiscal year '03. I can say that I have not seen
anything at the moment that persuades me that we will necessarily have to come
back for an additional supplemental in '03. Is that...
ZAKHEIM:
That's right. As things stand now, it looks actually
that are target which we
submitted and that the Congress gave us.
ZAKHEIM:
It's pretty accurate. And we are reviewing very carefully the spending rates.
We
have four and a half months to go in this fiscal year. We have already released
over $30 billion out of the supplemental, with more to come. But it's looking
like we're pretty much on target, sir.
STEVENS:
Thank you very much.
Senator Inouye?
INOUYE:
Mr. Secretary, defense transformation, you discussed in the closing moments
before the Authorizing Committees met, and I gathered that chances of passage
would be rather bad at this moment. If the act is not resolved and passed, how
would it affect your program?
RUMSFELD:
Well, let me make a couple of comments, then have Dov
make a couple of comments.
One, I'm told that we have 300,000 -- 320,000 to be precise -- men and women in
uniform doing jobs that are not jobs for men and women in uniform. They're jobs
that should be done by civilians. They're jobs that should be done by
contractors, and we're doing that because people are rational.
And we've got three choices in the department. We can either use someone in
uniform, who you can manage; or you can use a contractor, who you can manage;
or
you can use the civil service, which is very, very difficult to manage. So
people do the logical thing, they go and put a military person into a job
that's
not a military job.
We'll worried about the OPTEMPO. We're worried about
the fact that we've had to
call up Guard and Reserve. We're worried about the fact that we've had to have
stop-losses. And we prefer to have fewer stop-losses and fewer Guard and
Reserve
activated, and have them activated fewer number of
times and be more respectful
of their lives.
But with 320,000 military people doing civilian jobs; why?
RUMSFELD:
Simply because the rules are so difficult, they're so burdensome.
A second example. We can't hire people right out of
school. It's almost
impossible. Anyone else, a company can go over and go to a job fair at a
college, they can walk in and offer someone a job. We can't. Takes
months to
work through all the paperwork, all the civil service requirements.
Now, we've had a bunch of experiments going on at
through authorities that Congress gave us, and they've worked, they've done a
good job.
In my view, we need some flexibility to manage the department and we are
wasting
taxpayers' dollars because of the absence of that flexibility, in my view.
INOUYE:
Mr. Secretary, everyone agrees that our military must transform, and the Army
has taken the lead with the creation of the Stryker Brigades. This year the
Army
has testified that it needs six brigades. Do you support this?
RUMSFELD:
We have supported it by putting in the budget the money for all six Stryker
Brigades. As I recall, the decision that was made was to -- the first three are
already funded and en route. The next one has been funded and approved, as I
understand it.
Correct me, Dov, if I'm wrong.
ZAKHEIM:
That's right.
RUMSFELD:
And the next two will be subject to a discussion as to the Army coming back and
discussing ways they think they might improve or strengthen the Stryker model
for the fifth and sixth.
ZAKHEIM:
I could add to that, if I may. The first brigade is actually undergoing a
congressionally mandated evaluation at
effectiveness.
The second one is being fielded -- it's at
the Stryker vehicles, the team that is. And the Army's plan is coming in in
July, so it's relatively soon.
INOUYE:
I gather that advanced drafts have been distributed, and they seem to support
the fifth and sixth. Is that correct?
ZAKHEIM:
Well, the funding for all of them is in the plan, and it'll be with the
secretary of defense. And the secretary will decide when he looks at the Army
plan as to how and in what way the Stryker is being improved.
INOUYE:
Mr. Secretary, if I still have time, on the Navy's LPD- 17, has had some
problems, cost overruns and schedule slippage. What are your plans on this?
RUMSFELD:
Do you have that?
ZAKHEIM:
Yes, I do.
RUMSFELD:
Do you want to comment?
ZAKHEIM:
Sure. As you know, we essentially are gapping, as it were, not funding an
LPD-17
in fiscal year '05. We will have an LPD- 17 again in fiscal -- two LPD-17s in
fiscal year '06, and it looks like, we believe, that the shipbuilding
industrial
base can support the production gap.
In addition, we are talking about a move from these sorts of ships to a new kind
of maritime prepositioning ship, which is also in the
out years. And we're going
to evaluate how that transition can take place.
So the line remains open. We're funding those ships, the LPD-17, but at the
same
time as part of our overall transformation, we're looking at this new kind of
prepositioning ship.
INOUYE:
And what sort of ship is that?
ZAKHEIM:
Well, they are looking at designs right now. The concept is to incorporate some
of the elements of the amphibious-type LPD-17, which simply stands for Landing
Platform Dock ship, but in addition to take account of the prepositioning
needs
that were demonstrated again in Iraqi Freedom, as well as Enduring Freedom
before it.
INOUYE:
Hasn't it served its purpose and continued to do so?
ZAKHEIM:
There is a sense on the part of the Marine Corps and the Navy that for future
requirements, you may need considerably more flexibility than the LPD-17 gives
you.
Again, by definition, in funding one in '04 and two more in '06, you're
committed to those ships for 30 odd years beyond. So it's not a question of
those ships being useless or anything, the real issue is when you go past those,
do you want to have a further flexible capability than what they give you?
ZAKHEIM:
And so, it's not a question of those ships being useless or anything. The real
issue is when you go past those, do you want to have a further flexible
capability than what they give you and there seems to be a consensus that the
answer is yes and they're looking at how to design it.
RUMSFELD:
And the Navy Department and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of
Navy have been reviewing that as part of a broader look at the ship building
budgets, generally,
ZAKHEIM:
And there's no backing off at all sir from the requirement to be able to
project
power from ship to shore but as Admiral Clarke and General Haigi
(ph) and
General Jones before General Haigi (ph) has looked at
this and is looking at the
opportunities presented by the joint strike fighter in the Osprey and the
potential adding of the flight deck to some limited capability to the previous
(ph) ships.
That presents a whole new horizon. They want to make to make sure that the
recommendations they give to the Secretary and the money that's spent is spent
on the most capable ship in the future.
RUMSFELD:
Let me also add that we will continue to buy these ships through fiscal year
2010, which again an indication that we're not giving up or anything on a ship
like this, it's just a matter of...
You can't hear me?
STEVENS:
We're running out of time, Mr. Secretary.
RUMSFELD:
Sorry.
STEVENS:
Senator Burns?
BURNS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a question and maybe a thought, Mr.
Secretary, this morning.
As we have seen in the operation in
technology and the training that we had done prior to that operation really
paid
off. I am told that your ability through communications, the ability to systems
that were inoperable, that it gave the striking force a lot of flexibility even
before the operation started and during the operation that any mission could be
changed.
There's no doubt about it, it was a force, we have the most physically fit, and
I think most mentally alert military this nation has ever known. And really
people who understand technology and know how to use it.
BURNS:
we're also seeing in this country as we train for the force that you visualize
that will be our force of the future.
We're also seeing our ability to train, both in the airspace and land-based
facilities for our troops and our equipment. We see that being eroded due to
encroachment, environmental laws and a variety of other challenges that we have
in front of us.
I would wonder -- you'll be making the decisions of what kind of facilities and
what we're going to need to train for the future, and make that assessment, and
then probably would start dealing with those challenges ahead.
Can you tell us if there's a process in place now where you're making those
determinations based on what we've experienced in the
And at such time as to when Congress will be advised or assessed of what your
needs will be in the future areas of training and new technologies?
RUMSFELD:
Senator, thank you.
You're right. The Armed Forces of the
they have training ranges and facilities, and as the world's rules and
requirements change and evolve, the restrictions grow and the ability to
function is limited.
We currently have proposals in the transformation legislation before the
Congress that would provide some relief from some of the laws that are
hampering
defense training and that type of activity. For example, we've been delayed
over
six years in deployment of a surveillance-towed or ray- sensor system,
low-frequency active sonar system, which is needed against ultra-quiet diesel
submarines.
RUMSFELD:
It's part of the Marine Mammal Act. We proposed, last year, several
adjustments.
They tend not to really be directed at any of the laws that exist, but rather
at
the legal interpretations that have evolved over the decades since those laws
were passed that we feel we need some freedom from.
Do you want to comment, Pete, on this?
PACE:
Senator, we want to be good stewards in the environment. And we believe that we
can do both, be good stewards in the environment and train. And one of the
provisions is for this National Training Center that will be both live-fire
environments, such as Twentynine Palms and the
National Training Center and
Nellis Air Force Base, and the virtual environment,
that you can pull together
people throughout the entire nation without having to move anywhere to do a
very, very robust exercise.
So we are looking at that, sir. We do have a process. We're working through the
Defense Department to highlight those things that are current constraints, but
also to be able to project ways that we can protect the environment and train.
BURNS:
Well, General Pace, you know as well as anyone else that parts of
has come under fire that we cannot train in, that we used to use many years ago,
or even in modern day, your training out there. And this sort of concerns us.
We look at airspace used, especially in the southwestern part of the country,
where you have a lot of commercial flights where we see a restricting of
airspace both in the space and altitude in which we can train.
And I'm wondering if those assessments are not going on now, that we will be
able to be sharp, as we were in this 21 days in the
Iraqi operation? If we
cannot train and we cannot train under conditions like we're going to have to
fight, then I worry about those kind of conditions.
We can talk about equipment. We can talk about money. But if we can't train our
troops, that's something that we got to look at very seriously. And I would
also
add that, maybe in my home state of
(LAUGHTER)
Strictly parochial. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STEVENS:
Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd?
Senator Hollings?
HOLLINGS:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
HOLLINGS:
Mr. Secretary, that's an outstanding statement, and I congratulate you on
bringing Defense into the new century.
What happens -- and the reason I take the committee's time here to ask about
this little installation down in Charleston, back in '92 at the base
realignment
and closure, there was one thing that both George Bush Sr. Clinton could agree
on, and that was we are not going to close the Portsmouth navy yard. I mean, we
got the run up there in that primary.
So they closed
else.
But at the time, I had debated and argued to have Navalex
(ph) that you would
remember as a former secretary back in the '70s, and Navalex
(ph) was combined
into SPAWAR. They combined for
Secretary Ridge is right now, on
And the reason for the question, of course, a comment is an admiral now has
asked for a study to find what the cost of moving it. I hope we get that study,
because Bruce Allen (ph), the secretary of the Navy, has just completed
cost-efficiency study of 15 navy engineering centers and have found that the
SPAWAR facility down in
efficiencies, so it's a jointness.
We don't receive appropriated funds. What we do is we design, build, test, and
support computer command and control systems. And a bunch of little small
contractors, and since the big Navy yard has closed, the rent is cheap,
they
love it down there.
HOLLINGS:
And they've got room to move and expand, and they serve Army, Navy, Air, and
Marines, but they serve the White House, the Secret Service, the FAA and
everything else. It's all contract. It's the jointness
that Secretary Rumsfeld
is insisting on.
And if you could come visit us down there, you'll see it, and I think you can
use that as an example of succeeding in this jointness
effort.
Otherwise, Mr. Secretary, with
respect to rebuilding
as a military or a contract operation?
ZAKHEIM:
Well, I think I'd rather say what I think of it as rather than either, or.
First
of all, I think it is ultimately a task for the Iraqi people. If you don't -- I
don't think anyone can rebuild another country for a person; it's up to them to
do that. They're going to have to invest their time and their energy and their
funds in seeing that that country rebuilds after decades of leadership by a
vicious despot, who did not invest in the people, did not invest in the
infrastructure. He was building palaces and building weapons and putting money
in his own accounts outside the country. So it's going to take some time.
It's probably, second, going to be a task for the international community to
create -- to help the Iraqi people do what needs to be done. And it'll take
time.
Third, I don't think it can be done unless the country is in a reasonably
secure
and permissive environment, and that's what we need to help with.
HOLLINGS:
And that's the main point, it's got to start off military, because...
ZAKHEIM:
Exactly.
HOLLINGS:
... if you don't establish law and order, even after law and order is
established, they look upon and remember the countries of Greece and Portugal
coming into the common market, and the others, Germany, Italy and all taxed
themselves $5 billion over five years so they could develop the entities of
free
speech, free press, a respected judiciary, property ownership, and all of those
kind of things.
HOLLINGS:
Otherwise, if you begin with the people and the people themselves doing it, I
agree with you generally. But specifically, if you allow that, you're going to
end up with an Islamic democracy.
It'll be quite some time before we get one man, one vote in downtown Baghdad,
and the military is going to have to -- I had this experience with all of the
demonstrations and everything else, salus populi suprema lex -- the safety of
the people is the supreme law.
And when you've got all kind of entities demonstrating, breaking in, stealing
and everything else of that kind, you've got to establish the safety of the
people.
RUMSFELD:
You're absolutely right. Unless it's a reasonably secure environment, nothing
else happens.
HOLLINGS:
Right.
RUMSFELD:
It just doesn't work.
HOLLINGS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STEVENS:
Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to first talk a little about intelligence community
cooperation -- DOD with the intelligence community.
Would you give us a little analysis of how far the department; that is the
Department of Defense, has come since September 11 in improving your own
intelligence capabilities and cooperating with other intelligence agencies, and
what this budget would do to continue that work?
RUMSFELD:
Well, let me answer the second part first, the cooperation.
I suppose nothing's ever perfect in life. We're all human beings, and we're not
perfect. On the other hand, having been in and around government for a lot of
decades, I honestly believe that the linkages between the director of Central
Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies that
reside in the Department of Defense and the combatant commanders is, I would
say, better than ever in my knowledge.
RUMSFELD:
I meet with George Tenet probably several times a week, but we have lunch once
a
week.
And we have been able to knit it together at the top. General Franks was able
to
do that in the region, and he's currently doing it in
quite seamless between the two.
But it's better than it's been, hasn't it?
RUMSFELD:
Absolutely. Absolutely. And we work hard at it, and I
think it's much better.
How much progress are we making generally in the intelligence community? That's
a tougher question. I think time will tell.
And we're doing some big things. As we rewrite war plans and contingency plans
and think of them in the 21st century with the changed circumstances, there are
things that can be done in intelligence that will inform those plans and enable
us to do things differently.
And if we, in one case, for example, the sake of argument, two weeks warning
instead of two days warning, or two months warning instead of two weeks warning,
it can affect how we arrange ourselves.
We're into that, but we have not completed it. We're working hard at it.
But the intelligence initiative we're talking about, that's central to what you
plan to do and how you do it, is it not?
RUMSFELD:
Absolutely.
The National Aerospace Initiative. Mr. Secretary, you've been outspoken on the
importance of space to military operations and in your support of the National
Aerospace Initiative.
While the Air Force is partnering with NASA on various technology development
initiatives that support both their shared and unique mission objectives, I
think we can and should do much more to support the National Aerospace
Initiative.
Would you elaborate, if you could, on DOD's partnership with NASA in this
regard? Do you see it growing or not growing?
RUMSFELD:
I don't know, to be very direct.
RUMSFELD:
The department has had multiple linkages with NASA dating back to the time when
I was on the space committee, in the Congress in the 1960's, and they have
shifted as the focus of our space effort shift. They each have a distinctive
role, the civilian side and the military side. But we have over the decades,
the
department has benefited by the relationship, and certainly NASA has benefited
by the relationship. And how it will evolve in the future, I think, really, I'm
just not in the position to say.
Would you talk briefly, if you would, about using space superiority to fight
smarter, and what space-based radar will add to the department's war-fighting
capability. How important is space to all of this? I'd say very important, but
I'd like to get you..
RUMSFELD:
Indeed it is. Doug, just reminds me here that this
budget does provide $118
million for the National Aerospace Initiative to continue the development of
the
integrated approach. In the information age, space plays a critical role, and
it
will increase, not decrease, over time. The need for information and the
leverage it provides and the force multiplier it provides through improved
situational awareness and through the ability to interconnect the different
services and indeed different country services into combined joint efforts.
Space plays a critical linking role there. So you're absolutely correct.
SHELBY:
Sir, as you in space some of our sensors are affected by weather to answer your
question about space-based radar that will give us 24 hour a day, seven day a
week capability to see what we want and when we want.
(UNKNOWN)
Very important.
(UNKNOWN)
Yes, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld, lastly, the Predator and the Hellfire missile. A lot of us
view that as a real achievement, integrating the Hellfire missile onto the
space-based, to the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle. Do you see that growing
in
future, unmanned vehicles, weaponizing them and so
forth?
RUMSFELD:
I do. I think that the things that unmanned aerial vehicles -- indeed, I would
go so far as to say unmanned vehicles. They may be aerial. They may be surface.
They may be subsurface. They may be a variety of things. We will see evolving
over the decades ahead in ways that we probably don't even imagine today.
We have been significantly advantaged in the past two-and-a-half years by the
availability of unmanned aerial vehicles.
And a lot of that was put together very quickly with the help of our organic
labs, was it not?
RUMSFELD:
It was and, indeed, as I mentioned in my opening statement, with some prodding
from the Congress.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
STEVENS:
Senator Byrd?
BYRD:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And thank you, General Pace and Dr. Zakheim.
I note in yesterday's Washington Post the following headline: "
Spurs Call For Help." I'll read excerpts therefrom. "
officials said today that
order in the Iraqi capital and call for reinforcements to calm a wave of
violence that has unfurled over the city, undermining relief and reconstruction
efforts and inspiring anxiety about the future."
I was interested in your reference in your reference to the lessons that we
need
to have learned from the past and your comment that we need to apply the
lessons
from the experience in
It seems like we're learning the same lesson that
through the entire length of
occupation force. He needed a force that could stabilize.
BYRD:
He had the speed. He was a great general. And I think he was -- it was stated
by
Napoleon that
So he could level the cities, he could take the cities, but he could not hold
them, because he didn't have the forces to occupy and to stabilize. And as a
result, although he had numerous victories throughout the 16 years that he was
in
city after city, such as
And it seems we're having that same problem in
situation in
At this point there's little evidence that the
plan for the reconstruction of
may see a repeat of the situation in
to contain the chaos in
warlord control and turmoil.
And so, I think we have other lessons to learn besides those that you have
appropriately listed. We must learn from our mistakes and not be doomed to
repeat them.
Going into
government. Going into Baghda,d
we were warned by U.N. agencies and
nongovernmental organizations about the lack of water and the unsanitary
situations in the city. We knew that medical supplies were scarce. We knew that
military action would likely lead to mob action.
BYRD:
I hope that the recent shake-up in the civilian leadership of the
occupation authority will help the situation and will not amount to merely
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
BYRD:
But for the time being, it is the
maintaining order in
What specific and immediate steps are you taking as Secretary of Defense to
improve the security situation in
RUMSFELD:
Senator, let me comment on a number of pieces of that. We are -- first of all,
I
think the characterization of anarchy is not accurate. It's a headline writer's
phrase, and it certainly grabs attention. But we were on the phone and the
(inaudible) with the people there, and the circumstances is something other
than
anarchy.
You're quite right, you don't need to learn that lesson that it's important to
stabilize; that lesson's been learned throughout history. And General Franks
and
his team had plans, have plans, and have put in place plans to provide for the
security in that country.
It is important to note several things. Number one, every jail in that country
to my knowledge was emptied, so on the street are looters, hooligans, and bad
people. They have to be rounded up and put back in. That takes a little time.
You don't do that in 5 minutes.
If we emptied every jail in the United States of America today, you wouldn't in
50 days or 40 days or 30 days or however many days since that war has ended --
what is it, 20? Twenty days, I guess, 3 weeks. You wouldn't be able to round up
all those criminals and bad people and put them away again.
RUMSFELD:
They still are part of the old regime. And they have to be rounded up and
identified.
Next. We do have a good force there in the country. I
forget what it is, but
twenty-plus thousand. They have recruited and put back on the streets in that
country, I'm going to guess, close to 20,000 Iraqi police people.
We have had donors conferences and force-generation
conferences in
elsewhere to get coalition countries to come in and provide additional forces.
We have, if I'm not mistaken, plus or minus 15,000 additional
are due to arrive in
those forces and how they are actually utilized in
we have a plan, the answer is yes. We were briefed on it again today, and it's
being implemented.
My personal view is that the idea of chaos and turmoil and anarchy in the city
is, as I say, an overstatement. We were told today that maybe two-thirds to
three-quarters of the city is stable. Now, that's not permissive; it's stable.
Another portion of it, particularly in the north, is less so. And most of the
city, at night the hooligans are out and the criminals and trying to loot and
do
things. We've had people shot, wounded and killed in the last 48 hours there in
And it is a problem, it is critically important, as Senator Hollings said, that
the one thing that's central to success is security. We have a full court press
on that. The forces there will be using muscle to see that the people who are
trying to disrupt what's taking place in that city are stopped and either
captured or killed.
BYRD:
How many
number? And are there any other coalition forces currently in
PACE:
Sir, if I may, the current number of coalition forces,
greater
speak. General Franks and his commanders are reviewing the situation on the
ground to see how they might reset themselves in the city to be able to provide
the kind of patrolling and presence that's necessary to provide the stability
they need.
BYRD:
Can you speak to the number, the increase in forces?
PACE:
Sir, right now, you have the 1st Armored Division is arriving as we speak, and
that's an additional 20,000 troops who are arriving right now, sir, and they
will...
BYRD:
So that'll bring it up to 69,000?
PACE:
If General Franks and his commanders determine that that's where they should go,
yes, sir.
RUMSFELD:
But it is up to the combatant commander to decide how he deploys those troops,
and he has not, to my knowledge, made a final judgment on it.
PACE:
He has not, sir. And, sir, we're out of time, but I'd be wrong if I didn't
point
out that Jay Garner is a great American doing a great job, and the term
"shakeup" with regard to him and his administration and what he's
been doing
really does him a disservice.
This new civilian going over has always been part of the plan. I should defer
to
the secretary on this. But Jay Garner, under the
working under, has done a fabulous job.
BYRD:
My time is up. Let me ask one further question. What commitment has the
received, to date, for peacekeeping forces from other nations?
RUMSFELD:
First, let me just underline what General Pace said about General Garner. This
is a first-rate individual. He has been working since late last year. He's done
a spectacular job out there. He's put together a team of people and they're
living in very difficult circumstances.
RUMSFELD:
He is not being replaced. From the very outset, it was clearly understood that
at some point a senior civilian would be brought in, and Ambassador Bremer is
that individual. They are working closely together. And it's unfortunate when
the implication is suggested that there's some sort of a shake-up because
there's a problem. There is no shake-up. This has been part of the plan since
the very outset.
I can't answer your question about how many foreign troops have agreed. There
are, I believe, already something like eight or 10 countries that have
indicated
their willingness to send troops. Some of them, it depends on their parliament
approving it, some of them, it may depend on having a
U.N. connection of some
sort, which is now being worked on in
But the talk was of how many divisions. Do you recall?
PACE:
Sir, two divisions initially between now and next several months.
BRYD:
Would you please list those?
STEVENS:
The gentleman's time has expired. I'm sorry, Senator.
BYRD:
Yes. Yes, I understand that.
Would you please list those countries for the record?
RUMSFELD:
If they have publicly so stated, we'll be happy to.
STEVENS:
Very well.
Senator Cochran?
COCHRAN:
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, the recent experience in
PAC-3 system successfully defended our forces against Iraqi missile attacks.
COCHRAN:
My question is whether or not your assessment is consistent with the reports
that were made available to us in the press that this system worked as it was
intended and expected to work. And does the budget contain funds to continue to
build systems like this and others that might protect our forces and our
country
against even longer range missiles?
RUMSFELD:
The budget does have, as I note here, some $736 million for PAC-3; $561 million
of which is for procurement and $174 million for research, development, test
and
evaluation.
My preliminary impression is identical to yours. I know that the lessons
learned
will be coming back with greater specificity. But from what you hear
anecdotally, there's no question but that the PAC-3 was effective.
I should also add, however, that we do have to do a better job of deconflicting.
And you may recall that there were some incidents where PAC-3s actually
intercepted a
how we can improve that. It's always been true in every conflict that those
things happen, but our goal, obviously, is to do it perfectly, and in that case,
we didn't.
Pete?
PACE:
Yes, sir. A
COCHRAN:
General Pace, I understand that the Medium Extended Air Defense Systems, MEADS,
may offer significant enhancements over the PAC-3. But because of funding
constraints and other considerations, it's not to be fielded until fiscal year
2012. Is this an accurate assessment of when we will see this system deployed?
And what is the outlook for deployment of other systems that build upon the
PAC-3 successes?
PACE:
Sir, there's about $280 million in this particular budget for the medium-range
missile. I do not know the date, as you stated. I'll have to take that for the
record. But I can reinforce the fact that the PAC-3 system and, in fact, all
the
PATRIOT systems in Iraq, in Kuwait, the first analysis is that every troop
concentration was under an umbrella of a missile system and that no missile got
into any of those umbrellas.
COCHRAN:
Well, I want to congratulate you and the secretary in the leadership that's
being provided to ensure that we can continue to build upon those successes of
missile defense. We know that test bed
intent is to deploy a system that can defend against much longer range missiles
in the future.
Do you think the budget request for those longer-range systems and the
construction schedule is sufficient to meet our needs for defense capability
for
our homeland?
RUMSFELD:
Senator, I know you've been long and active in this important area. With the
end
of the ABM Treaty and the ability for the first time to go out and actually
test
different ways of doing things,
we were able to move into a period that has
contributed to our knowledge and to the country's knowledge in these
technologies, and that's a good thing.
It's a good thing from the standpoint of each possible alternative of boost and
mid-range and terminal. It's a good thing from the standpoint of the system you
mentioned for Alaska. It's also a good thing from the standpoint of sea-based
systems.
And my feeling is that General Kadish, who's done a
terrific job in that role,
in my view, has got a pretty good balance in his proposals as to where we ought
to put our money to gain additional knowledge and, as you point out, to also
develop this beginning of a capability to intercept relatively low numbers of
ICBMs.
COCHRAN:
On another subject, I know that both the Navy and the Army have been
experimenting with leased vessels to define the requirements of the littoral
combat ship in case of the Navy, and the theater support vessel that the Army
considers important for its purposes. I understand, too, the Army is
considering
leasing a lot more of these vessels.
COCHRAN:
They're catamaran-type vessels, high-speed vessels. We have shipbuilding firms
on the Mississippi gulf coast that are very capable of building cost-effective
ships for our military, and I wonder whether you'll look at this leasing plan
and see whether or not it might be more appropriate to build these ships rather
than to lease foreign vessels for experimentation and analysis.
RUMSFELD:
Let me have Dov answer that.
ZAKHEIM:
Well, one of the reasons, Senator, that these leases are being looked at is
because they're still trying to define exactly what kind of platforms they have
in mind. The littoral combat ship's a good example. I know down in Mississippi
you have a tremendous composite facility which would come up with a completely
new type of composite ship.
The issue really is defining requirements. And until they've got that nailed
down -- and as you know, the Navy's been working on that, for its part, and the
Army for theirs -- in order to just get a sense of what requirements might be
needed, they are leasing. I don't believe that that is the long-term intention.
COCHRAN:
Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
STEVENS:
Senator Leahy?
LEAHY:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Interesting in listening to this, and interesting how much we have improved in
the high-tech area of our military, Mr. Secretary -- Mr. Secretary, you and I
have talked before about such things as using drones and all, and I think we're
in absolute agreement on -- in fact, especially for surveillance and everything
else, it's a lot easier to stick something up there, and if it does get shot
down you've lost a drone, you haven't lost a person. They can stay longer and
you have more flexibility.[
We also might note, this committee funded an advanced data link that allowed
targeting information to go to our aircraft quickly. That was an initiative
that
I had worked on.
ZAKHEIM:
This committee had funded it. I hear that our pilots over there at the gateway
made a real difference, and I want to compliment those who used it.
In Iraq, we confirmed the total force concept. We had the guard reserves,
active
force fighting side by side. The commander was telling me they were an integral
part of our military victory.
I'm concerned, however, that our benefits by our central Reservists haven't
changed. Example, about 20 percent of the Reserves don't currently possess
adequate health insurance. I'm told this undermines readiness, undermines
recruitment and so on, retention.
We do support legislation to make Reservers eligible
for tri-care (ph) on a
cost-share basis.
RUMSFELD:
Senator...
LEAHY:
And I must say, I'm the co-chair of the Guard Caucus, and we have a lot of --
it's a bipartisan, we have a lot of members who are interested.
RUMSFELD:
I've discovered that I'd best not answer questions like that until I look at
the
numbers and the cost and see what one has to give up to have something like
that.
LEAHY:
You'll do that and submit it to me?
RUMSFELD:
We will be happy to take a look at it and see what the costs are. I would add
this, that you're quite right, however, in the -- total force concept works. It
has worked in the conflict, it is working today.
But one of the delays in calling people up was that, you're right, their teeth
needed to be fixed and various other things that they hadn't paid attention to.
And it may very well be at some point that there will be some advantage in
having certain elements of the Guard and Reserves more ready, that is to say
having had their teeth checked and having had those kinds of physical checks,
so
that there is not a delay and a big paperwork rush when you're trying to get
people on active duty.
LEAHY:
I'm also concerned about the health insurance. There is a long hiatus they may
be without it.
LEAHY:
And I'd be glad to work with your staff on this, but this is a growing concern.
Those of us in the caucus and both parties are concerned about -- we hear from
our home states and all -- I think it is something -- we're pushing for
legislation on this. I think it is something that could be done. I think
ultimately it'd be a very cost- effective thing.
I realize this is not a question where you'd have the answers on the top of
your
head, but would you direct your staff to work with mine so that we can share
this information with the whole guided caucus?
RUMSFELD:
We'll be happy to dig into it. Thank you.
LEAHY:
Mr. Secretary, were you surprised that we haven't found any weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq yet?
RUMSFELD:
Not really. I've believed all along that the inspections with the U.N.
inspectors had very little prospects of finding anything by discovery. I've
always believed that they would be -- they or the people on the ground, in this
case, us -- will have the best prospects of finding the weapons programs and
documentation and the weapons themselves through people who've been involved in
those programs and come up and tell us where to look.
The government lived many lives, but one of the lives they lived for decades --
at least better than a decade -- was the ability to fool the inspectors. They
actually arranged themselves so that they could live with U.N. inspectors.
LEAHY:
Well, no, I understand that, and I've read a number of the reports as you have,
reports that we can't go into in open session. But we are on the ground now.
We've gone to a number of the areas, gone extensively into a number of the
areas
that we had felt and our military and our intelligence had felt would be areas
of weapons of mass destruction and have not discovered anything.
I wonder if those weapons are there, why they -- if they were, they were not
used against our troops.
LEAHY:
I'm very thankful for that, as are you and General Pace and everybody else. But
I wondered why they weren't.
I'm also concerned, if they were there, especially in the areas that we had
said
that we wanted to look at it, and now have looked at, is there any possibility
that they've seeped out and under the control of terrorists whose interests are
inimical to use?
RUMSFELD:
I certainly wouldn't say that something like that is not possible. With porous
borders -- and that country, I suppose, have borders pretty much like we do
with
Canada and Mexico -- there are plenty of things that move back and forth across
those borders in Iraq that...
LEAHY:
You probably don't want to go too, too far with comparing Iraq's and Syria's
borders with ours with Canada and Mexico; we're a little bit friendlier with
those two countries, I hope.
RUMSFELD:
Well, my goodness, yes.
LEAHY:
I live only an hour's drive from Canada.
RUMSFELD:
Well, we have wonderful people on both sides trying to maintain the border. But
the fact is that things move across those borders, and they're moving clearly
across the Iranian border, the Syrian border into Iraq and out of Iraq.
And I don't think that I could say that with certainly that things weren't
moved
out either by the government of Iraq or by others.
LEAHY:
But you don't have any indication that they had set up with the intent of using
such weapons against our forces when we began to attack.
RUMSFELD:
I'm trying to think what I can say in an open session, and I guess there's not
much I can say in an open session.
LEAHY:
Well, then, perhaps what you may want to do is submit it in a normal classified
fashion, a response on that one.
RUMSFELD:
I mean the fact is, we do see intel chatter that
suggests that things might have
moved. But...
LEAHY:
No, I'm talking about the fact why they did not use it against us.
Mr. Chairman, could I request the staff so clear it for such information,
follow-up on that last question in a classified form? Thank you.
DOMENICI:
(OFF-MIKE) the stability and lack of stability in the daily lives of the people
of that country. And I remain genuinely concerned that we are in a situation
where we have won the war and we lose the battle. And so, I can't stress enough
that we do whatever is necessary to bring law and order to that country and
that
we establish some kind of a plan, quickly, for the orderliness of that society.
I understand that we were surprised by a number of things, such as the
condition
of their infrastructure. We assumed that it was better than it is. It is
breaking down in places, in intervals that we have not expected and that causes
confusion, causes concern, and ultimately blaming Americans if things aren't
going right.
In that regard, I wonder why your answers continue to be that this will be
handled by the distinguished general who won the war. I wonder why it is his
job
to keep that situation going, and why there is not some other kind of order
that
is going to be established quickly that is not under his direct command. If you
might answer that for me in a moment I'd appreciate it.
Secondly, it seems to me that it is absolutely imperative that the U.S. States
maintain order regardless of how difficult it is, because without it there is a
real chance that the people of that country will assume that the victory that
we
claim is not a victory at all.
Could I have your comments on that, quickly, and I have two other brief
questions?
RUMSFELD:
Yes, number one, the president has said publicly that the United States and
coalition forces will put whatever number of forces are needed for as long as
they are needed. And there is no disagreement about the importance of providing
security.
Second, the command arrangements are as follows: The combatant commander
reports
to me and I report to the president. He has the responsibility for security in
that country. The humanitarian side of that and the non-security side, the
non-military side is now in the hands of the individual who's been mentioned
previously, Ambassador Jerry Bremer. And he has under him all of those things
other than security, and he reports to me, and I report to the president.
The infrastructure, as you properly point out, was badly degraded over the
decades. The power situation, for example, in Baghdad, is so fragile that
getting it back working 100 percent of the city, 100 percent of the time is not
a simple matter and it takes some time.
For example, prior to the war, only 60 percent of Iraqis had reliable access to
safe drinking water, 10 of Al Basrah's 21 potable
water treatment facilities
were not functionable before the war.
Now, as I said earlier, you empty all the jails and you put a bunch of
hooligans
out and you look at an infrastructure that wasn't working before the war and
then everyone says, Well my goodness, it's chaos, it's turmoil. What's the
matter with you? You've been there for 21 days and you haven't solved all the
problems.
I think that they are doing a terrific job. They will continue to do a better
job. The circumstances of people in that country are better than they were
before the war. They're going to get better every day.
We're finding mass graves, thousands of human beings that were killed by that
government. What should we do? Would you rather have a policeman here or
someone
down there guarding those graves?
RUMSFELD:
Would we rather have someone here? There's lots of priorities. And we cannot
make a country that has been badly treated and abused and a people that have
been badly treated and abused for decades, we can't make it right, we can't
make
it like the United States in five minutes, and we know that.
And we've got wonderful people out there doing a darn good job, and their
circumstance is going to get better every single day.
DOMENICI:
Mr. Secretary, I wholeheartedly agree with you, and I'm not arguing with you.
I'm merely suggesting for the public record that if there's one thing we are
good at it is establishing order and establishing a way of putting things into
a
sense of order and developing construction techniques and construction formats
that are credible and that the people will believe and can see. And I merely
urge that these happen quickly. I haven't heard much about that. I assume that
I
will. And I thank you for your answer.
My second question has to do with one that has bothered me in terms of
informing
the public of something we did that was rather spectacular. Our ability to
target our weapons was a spectacular achievement. It is a combination of
technology, much of which is secret, much of which we cannot divulge.
But I have wondered whether or not it is possible that you could have a neutral
group evaluate how we went about, what care we took, how much emphasis, energy,
time, money and resources we put into this episode and have it as some kind of
a
feature to show the world what we've done.
So far it is just something that we can see in terms of the effect. It would
seem to me it would make an incredible story, put forth by credible writers, as
to what we had to go through to get there.
DOMENICI:
I can imagine the hours spent in trying to determine which target versus another
target. I can imagine time spent looking at a building to see who occupied it
and when, so we would know whether or not to strike it or not because the
occupants are innocent people.
In fact, I happen to know those kinds of decisions were made.
It seems to me that to get that out in a tabloid form where everybody could
understand and see it would be a remarkable positive for American involvement
in
this particular war.
I would like your comments and I thank you for your testimony.
RUMSFELD:
Senator, you're certainly obviously very knowledgeable and exactly correct. The
hundreds of hours and the hundreds of people that were involved in looking at
targets and making judgments about which targets would give the greatest
advantage with the least potential for collateral damage, what time of day to
strike a target, where there'd be the fewest innocent people in any area, what
direction the weapon should be directed so that it would avoid civilian areas,
what type of weapon of use, how to use that weapon, how to fuse it. All of
those
things were gone into with enormous care and detail.
And you're right, it would be a story that would reflect very well on the
United
States and on the people involved.
DOMENICI:
Would you mind taking a look at whether that could be done?
RUMSFELD:
I will certainly take a look at whether it could be done.
DOMENICI:
I don't mean to burden you with all the other things you have, but it seems to
me to be as public relations a very, very positive kind of thing.
Thank you.
STEVENS:
The gentleman's time has expired.
DOMENICI:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STEVENS:
Senator Feinstein?
FEINSTEIN:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to take this discussion in a slightly different way,
and
I wanted to talk about the robust nuclear earth penetrator.
I read the Nuclear Posture Review when it came out in 2002 and saw where if
that
were put into actual public policy, there would be a substantial departure from
where this nation in the past was going with respect to nuclear weapons.
FEINSTEIN:
And then as I looked at the doctrines of unilateralism and preemption and see
the authorization that's been requested for $15 million to begin a tactical
nuclear weapon such as a robust earth penetrator, the
likelihood is that that
will pass, and then we will be faced with an appropriation of money to begin
that movement.
The way I see it, it is a blurring between conventional and nuclear weapons
that
may very well undermine our efforts to limit proliferation and give nuclear
armaments a role in this new United States doctrine of preemption. So I am
obviously very concerned about it and wonder why, with the massive conventional
weaponry that we have at our disposal, you know, whether it be a Daisy Cutter
or
Bunker- buster or the other things that we have used, why it is necessary at
this particularly tenuous point in time to begin a new effort with respect to
nuclear weapons, which can only, in my view, take us down a disastrous course.
RUMSFELD:
Senator, let me make a few comments on some of the things you said so that the
record is very clear. You indicated that there is a proposal that you think is
going to pass to develop a tactical nuclear weapon, I believe you said.
FEINSTEIN:
An authorization for $15 million for a robust nuclear earth penetrator.
RUMSFELD:
Right. And I think that's not accurate. I think that there is a proposal to
fund
a study (inaudible) let me tell you why.
RUMSFELD:
You smile, but it's a serious matter that we do not have in the inventory the
ability to deal with an underground, deeply buried target. We are looking and
studying a variety of ways that that might be done, one of which is the one
you're mentioning, which is a study, not the development, not the building, no
major departure, as you suggested.
And I would say this, that I don't think it would blur studying the possibility
of developing in several different ways, one of which is the one you mentioned,
an ability to hit a target that's deeply buried is not going to, in my view,
blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.
You're right. If you study it, someone might say, Well, then you could build it
some day. And that's true, you could. You could decide it, but that's a totally
different issue, and it is not part of what's before the Congress, as your
statement suggested.
Why do I not think that it would blur it? Nuclear weapons were used once in
1945, and they've not been fired sense in anger. That's an amazing record for
human beings. Never in the history of mankind have there been weapons that
powerful or anything approximating it, that distinctly different that haven't
been used. They have not been used.
Now, what does that mean? It means at least civilized countries, democracies,
the ones that have those weapons thus far and the few that are not democracies
that have them, have made a conscience decision that there is a big difference
in crossing that threshold.
The United States has been at war in Korea. We've been in war in Vietnam. We've
been in war lots of places since 1945, and they've never been used. No
president
is going to think that the line is blurred suddenly because of a study to see
if
we can develop an ability for a deep earth penetrator,
in my view.
FEINSTEIN:
May I engage you further on that?
RUMSFELD:
Sure.
FEINSTEIN:
The unclassified version of the Nuclear Posture Review puts forward several
scenarios in which the United States would consider a first-use of nuclear
weapons.
FEINSTEIN:
I can mention them here if you wish. And when that comes out, in 2002, although
it was somewhat debunked by the administration, a year later we find that the
studies are beginning to develop tactical nuclear weapons. Yes, this was only
used once before. But it was used by the United States.
And now we have concern about India and Pakistan. We have serious concern about
North Korea. And our efforts have
been to limit the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. To me, it's counterproductive to our overall purposes of limiting
proliferation to begin studies take us into the area of the use of tactical
nuclear weapons. Would you comment?
RUMSFELD:
You bet. I have to again correct what you said. You said we have now found out
that the U.S. is beginning to develop tactical nuclear weapons.
FEINSTEIN:
No, I didn't. I beg your pardon.
RUMSFELD:
Oh, I misunderstood that.
FEINSTEIN:
No, I said we've now find that a study. I mean I accept your word. I've no
reason not to accept your word. But this is a study.
RUMSFELD:
But my point is, we have tactical nuclear weapons, theater nuclear weapons.
We've had them for decades. They exist. We have lots of them. We have a
fraction
of those
FEINSTEIN:
Why did you confine it to the robust earth penetrator,
which is nuclear?
RUMSFELD:
I did. I pointed out it's a study and it's not the development of a tactical
nuclear weapon as you suggested. It just isn't. We have lots of studies and we
should do studies, war plans, and contingency plans, and we should have those.
We don't use them all, obviously.
The job of the Department of Defense is to be prepared to defend the American
people. And that's what we do. We plan, we study things. We try to develop
different kinds of capabilities from time to time. But any development program
would have to come before this body.
FEINSTEIN:
Now, I understand that. It's just in the public policy that one might look at
nuclear weapons and if we are trying to discourage their use. Now that we have
this well established doctrine of preemptive action, unilateral action, and you
add to this possible scenarios, where nuclear weapons could be used, why does
that not encourage other nations to become nuclear in response?
RUMSFELD:
Well, first let me say one thing. You mentioned unilateral action. In the Iraq
effort, there were 49 nations involved. I keep reading in the press about
unilateral this and going it alone that, it was baloney, there were 49
countries
in one way or another assisting in that effort. It seems to me that that's just
a fact.
If you think about the proliferation problem, it's a serious problem. And I
agree completely with you and I worry about it a great deal. The fact is we
could have 50 percent more -- even 100 percent more nuclear nations in the next
15 to 20 years, and that's not a happy world to live in; it's not a good thing.
The idea that our studying a deeper penetrator,
studying a nuclear deep earth
penetrator is going to contribute to proliferation, I
think ignores the fact
that the world is proliferating. It is happening. It is happening without any
studies by us. It is going on all around us. North Korea is -- will sell almost
anything it has by way of military technology for hard currency. That's what
they do.
I think that any implication that a study in the department for that would
contribute to proliferation simply isn't consistent with the facts because
we've
got a world that is filled with proliferation, it is pervasive.
STEVENS:
The senator's time has expired.
FEINSTEIN:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STEVENS:
We'll now go to (inaudible) round and limit (inaudible) to five minutes. I've
agreed that the secretary and general and deputy secretary would be able to
leave at 12:30.
Let me start off with just one statement, Senator Feinstein. The implication of
the senator's questions are that Harry Truman was wrong. Two of us sitting here
were part of the 2 million man force that was in the Pacific that might have
had
to be used to invade Japan.
STEVENS:
I think Harry Truman goes down in history for having the courage to make that
decision -- not that I think any future president will make the same decision,
but if in that same position, I hope we have the weapons and I hope we have the
president that has the courage to make the decision for our national survival.
My question to you know though, Mr. Secretary, we have a situation on these
weapons of mass destruction. Several of us were among those who were briefed by
your intelligence people, the CIA and others on the probable existence of those
weapons. I think it's absolutely necessary we follow every possible avenue to
get them.
My question is, have you advertised a reward for those people who might have
that knowledge? Have any one of those people who come forward and gives us the
knowledge of the existence of those is dead unless we take care of them. I hope
we're advertising that there's a substantial sum of money for creating a new
life if they come forward and help us get that information.
RUMSFELD:
I have not seen radio or leaflets or specific documents that do that. I do know
that we've asked that that be done and that there are reward systems and that
people are being encouraged to come forward. And that I have said publicly to
the Iraqi people that their circumstance will be much better if they come
forward.
And the problem of amnesty is a difficult one because of the fact that the
Iraqi
people may decide to make judgments about Iraqi people who served Saddam
Hussein's regime. So it's a tricky business.
STEVENS:
Well, we moved this gentleman who came forward from Private Lynch and brought
him to this country immediately. I think we have that power now. I hope we use
it in terms of these sites for these weapons.
RUMSFELD:
I agree, it's extremely important.
STEVENS:
Let me ask one last question so others may have some time.
STEVENS:
I know that it was taken into the regular service. I guess we've called up
Guardsmen and Reserve people.
We are now, I'm told, demobilizing 50,000 Reservists and Guardsmen per month,
but we're still calling other people up. What can we say in terms of this
process of demobilization as far as the Guard and Reserve is concerned?
RUMSFELD:
Senator, let me say a couple of things. First of all, we are not demobilizing
50,000 a month. I don't know where that came from. What we...
STEVENS:
That statement was made to us during the supplemental on the record here, that
we would demobilize 50,000 a month.
RUMSFELD:
We "would" is what it said I think. You said, "we are."
STEVENS:
That was the aggressive assumption that was given to us at the time, that we
would demobilize 50,000 a month.
RUMSFELD:
I think that may have been an assumption in a proposal that suggested at the
point where it was possible to do so. From a security standpoint on the ground,
you would then begin demobilizing.
Thus far, what we've returned to the United States both active Guard and
Reserve
are essentially Navy and Air Force personnel, practically no Army or Marines
have been brought back.
STEVENS:
The projections in that budget supplement were about, we thought, perhaps 90
days of combat. That turned out to be not the right number. We thought there
would be 50,000 per month, because we had to have some kind of projection so we
could prepare a budget supplemental that had some validity to it. That's where
the 50,000 per month comes from.
As we sit here, the services are going through their own analysis and will
present to the secretary later this week or at the beginning of next week their
proposals on how to reconstitute the force, active and reserve, in a very
systematic way that allows us to have the force on station as needed today and
allows us to regenerate our long-term capability.
STEVENS:
OK. I don't want to take the time for it now, but that assumption was the
assumption for our supplemental. I started today by asking you about it -- have
you got enough money? -- that's tied into that matter. If we were not going to
demobilize them, then you don't have enough money to keep them much longer.
Would you give us a statement for the record of what we can see in terms of
that
demobilization, how it affects the money that you've still got available?
RUMSFELD:
Yes, sir, we will do that.
I will just say briefly. What we did was, we made a set of assumptions and said
they were only assumptions. And that if it played out this way, this is roughly
what it would cost. And then, we said if this were longer, this would be
shorter, and therefore it balanced.
And we thought that regardless of whether the assumptions proved to be exactly
right, which as Pete points out they're not right, nonetheless, the money might
be roughly the same. At least at this moment the controller believes that's the
case.
STEVENS:
But it looks to me like both were longer, Mr. Secretary.
RUMSFELD:
Well, the war was shorter.
ZAKHEIM:
The war was shorter, and in addition if you keep the people out there, then
you're not spending the money that we did assume in budget to bring them back.
So there really is an offsetting factor. And we're still pretty confident in
the
number that we got from you for the supplemental.
STEVENS:
Right. I'd like to see a paper on it, if we can.
RUMSFELD:
And, sir, if we were continuing the war instead of like 90 days, think of the
ammunition we'd be using and the cost of replenishing all of that.
So there were so many variables that I think we're probably in the ballpark.
STEVENS:
Senator Inouye?
INOUYE:
Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, if the information is not classified; three weeks ago in the
height of our battle there, can you give us the statistics on the number of
troops -- Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines -- in that theater?
PACE:
Sir, I can give you a rough guesstimate and give you the exact numbers for the
record. But right now Army is at about 160,000; the Marine Corps is at about
65,000; the Navy and Air Force are both at about 30,000 each, sir.
INOUYE:
That's in the theater, not in Iraq.
PACE:
In the theater. That adds up today -- I don't know if these numbers that I just
gave to you, but I do know that the overall number today is right at about
309,000, of which U.S. in-country correct number is approximately 142,000.
INOUYE:
Is it correct that the Marines sent about 60 percent of their combat available
forces there?
PACE:
I think that math is right. Yes, sir. They had 66,000 of their operating forces
there. That sounds about right.
INOUYE:
The Army, the equivalent of four divisions?
PACE:
That sounds right, sir.
INOUYE:
And the Navy equivalent of six carrier battle groups?
PACE:
Five, sir.
INOUYE:
Five?
I ask this because this was the bulk of our military, wasn't it, Mr. Secretary?
RUMSFELD:
It was certainly a...
INOUYE:
You've got 10 divisions available in the Army; 60 percent of the Marines were
there; five carriers out of nine that are available. My question was, with that
type of commitment and assignment, should we be discouraging some of our fellow
Americans to consider ourselves invincible?
You know, soon after the battle they were talking about going to Syria,
possibly
North Korea.
RUMSFELD:
Yes, I see your point.
I'd like to answer for the record the answer as to whether it was the bulk
because the Reserve call up was not the bulk, and, therefore, if we took the
totality of the United States Armed Forces, I think I would guess that it was
not a majority.
(UNKNOWN)
That true, sir.
RUMSFELD:
And second, you're certainly right that --I should add-- that they were only
there for a relatively short period of time. There was a gradual buildup and
then a gradual draw down, with the Air Force and Navy moving out within some
cases a relatively short period of time.
But you're right. No nation is capable of doing everything on the face of the
Earth at every moment. And certainly those people in the Department of Defense
who worry with these things every day and recognize the costs and the
circumstances of our forces understand that fully.
STEVENS:
Senator Byrd?
BYRD:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The word that I used earlier, Mr. Secretary, was shake-up. And you seemed to
take some, not necessarily I would say umbrage, but you sought to differ that
classification. Let me read from the Philadelphia Inquirer of May 13, as
follows: "The new U.S. civilian overseer, a former diplomat L. Paul
Bremer, who
arrived yesterday to take over the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance, from Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, is facing his own
house cleaning. Barbara Boudin, the State Department
official overseeing the
reconstruction of Baghdad was reassigned after three weeks on the job, and at
least five other senior members of the ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance) staff also will be returning home, a senior U.S.
official said yesterday."
So, I offer that for the record in support of the word which I used, that being
shake-up. Now...
RUMSFELD:
Can I comment on that?
BYRD:
Oh, yes. How much time do I have, Mr...
(UNKNOWN)
About three-and-a-half minutes, sir. Depends on when the secretary wants to
leave.
BYRD:
Oh, he's in no hurry to leave.
(LAUGHTER)
(UNKNOWN)
He's in a fighting mood, I can tell you that.
(LAUGHTER)
RUMSFELD:
Senator, let me comment on that article, some -- whatever paper it was, because
something is in the press, of course, doesn't make it so.
BYRD:
The Philadelphia Inquirer.
RUMSFELD:
Right, now, first of all, just some facts. Number one, he was not sent out
there
as part of a shake-up. He was sent out there as presidential envoy. He was not
sent out there to replace Mr. -- General Garner as head of the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, he was sent out there as a
presidential envoy.
The individual you mentioned who was reassigned had not been there three weeks.
I can remember seeing her in December or January, which was months ago, when I
visited their office in the Pentagon and then again when I saw them off in the
parking lot of the Pentagon to see them away, which was in, I believe, December
or January. So it's a lot more than three weeks.
There are a number of things in that article with which I would differ.
BYRD:
For months, Mr. Secretary, the administration warned of the potential nuclear
capabilities of Iraq. Indeed, one of the main justifications for U.S. action in
Iraq was to ensure that nuclear weapons and material did not fall into the hands
of terrorists. It has been widely reported that U.S. troops in Baghdad have
secured some buildings, including the oil ministry. But according to the story
in the Washington Post on May 10, Air Force has failed to prevent looting at
seven nuclear facilities.
I quote from the article: "It is not clear what has been lost in the
sacking of
Iraq's nuclear establishment, but it is well-documented that looters roamed
unrestrained among stores of chemical elements and scientific files that would
speed development in the wrong hands of a nuclear or a radiological bomb. Many
of the files and some of the containers that held radioactive sources are
missing." Close quote.
The administration argued that war against Iraq was necessary to prevent the
spread and development of nuclear weapons, and yet by failing to protect these
sites, we may have actually facilitated the spread and development of nuclear
weapons.
I understand the importance of protecting the oil ministry so that the daily
running of Iraq could continue.
BYRD:
But given that one of the reasons for invading Iraq was to prevent the spread
of
nuclear materials and capabilities, why were these sites not protected, Mr.
Secretary?
RUMSFELD:
Senator, I don't believe anyone that I know in the administration ever said
that
Iraq had nuclear weapons. So the statement I think you read, that we've warned
of potential nuclear capability in weapons and materials in the hands of
terrorists, in terms of their having them now, I don't know anyone who
suggested
that that was the case.
The Central Intelligence Agency, I know, has assessed that they had a nuclear
program and assessed that they had chemical and biological weapons. Slight
difference from the article.
As to looting, my understanding is that a number of sites were located by U.S.
forces, coalition forces on the ground. They were looked at, and a judgment was
made that they should go to a different site and look at those other sites.
In some cases before they got there, things were looted. In some cases possibly
after they got there and went to another site, things may have been looted. It
is not possible to have enough forces in a country instantaneously to guard
every site before somebody can get into it.
I don't know about the choice between the oil ministry and some site that that
article may be referring to. I do know that they had a lot of tasks to do. They
had to win the war, they had to deal with death squads of Fedayeen
Saddam, they
had to deal with Baath party members in civilian
clothes that were trying to
kill them.
RUMSFELD:
And all and all, I think they did a darn good job. We have no evidence to
conclude, as that article suggests might have happened, that, in fact, nuclear
materials did leave and get into the hands of people. I don't have evidence
that
it did or didn't. That's the best I can do.
BYRD:
Why was protecting these well-known nuclear facilities not at least as high
priority as protecting the oil ministry?
RUMSFELD:
My impression is, from what I know and I'd have to check, that a number of
sites
were protected. There are something like, at the present time -- and the number
changes every month or every week -- but I believe there are something like 578
suspected weapon of mass destruction sites.
What does that mean? Does it mean they're all sites where something -- No, it
just means that there was a scrap of information here that suggested that
somebody might have been doing something there and you ought to check it out.
But there are hundreds of these possible sites. We also have intelligence that
suggested that they took the documentation and a number of the materials,
dispersed them and hid them, in some cases in private residences.
So how does any force of any size instantaneously get to all of those locations
and provide perfect security for them so someone can't loot them? I think it's
an unrealistic expectation.
STEVENS:
Senator, I'm sorry. I've got a bunch of appointments, and we guaranteed the
secretary we'd be threw here at 12:30. He has, as I understand it, go to the
White House for a meeting. So with your cooperation, I'd like to let him go.
BYRD:
Is this a filibuster you're setting off?
STEVENS:
You're not filibustering yet, Senator. I've seen you filibuster. This is not...
(LAUGHTER)
BYRD:
Well, we'll be talking with the secretary again.
Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary.
RUMSFELD:
Terrific. Thank you, sir.
BYRD:
Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous consent that the article from The Washington
Post of Tuesday, May 13, entitled "Baghdad Anarchy Spurs Call For
Help" that it
be included in the record in its entirety?
STEVENS:
It will be.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Pace and Secretary Zakheim.
The subcommittee
will reconvene Thursday, May 15, to consider testimony from public witnesses
concerning the president's budget request.
Thank you very much.